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Abstract
We define and study the complexity of robust polynomials for Boolean
functions and the related fault-tolerant quantum decision trees, where
input bits are perturbed by noise. We compare several different possible
definitions. Our main results are
• For every n-bit Boolean function f there is an n-variate polynomial
p of degree O(n) that robustly approximates it, in the sense that
p(x) remains close to f(x) if we slightly vary each of the n inputs of
the polynomial.
• There is an O(n)-query quantum algorithm that robustly recovers
n noisy input bits. Hence every n-bit function can be quantum
computed with O(n) queries in the presence of noise. This contrasts
with the classical model of Feige et al., where functions such as parity
need Θ(n log n) queries.
We give several extensions and applications of these results.
1 Introduction
In the last two decades, polynomials of many varieties have been used quite
successfully in complexity theory, both for upper and lower bounds. We study
a variety here that is tailored to analyzing algorithms with noisy input.
Robust Polynomials. A robust polynomial for a Boolean function f : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1} is a real multivariate polynomial p(z1, . . . , zn) such that for every x =
(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n and every z = (z1, . . . , zn) ∈ Rn, if ∀i : |xi − zi| ≤ 1/3
then |f(x) − p(z)| ≤ 1/3 (the 1/3 in both cases can be changed to any other
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positive constant less than 1/2). The robust degree of f is the smallest degree
of a robust polynomial for f ; note that we do not require robust polynomials to
be multilinear.
The motivation behind the definition of robust polynomials is twofold. First,
it can be viewed as a strengthening (restriction) of the notion of approximating
polynomials. An approximating polynomial for f is a multivariate real poly-
nomial q that approximates f within an additive term of 1/3 for each Boolean
input. Approximating polynomials for Boolean functions are of interest in them-
selves and have been the object of study for quite a while. Their minimal degree
is tightly related to the decision tree complexity of f [11, 4]. Indeed, this “poly-
nomial method” [4] is one of the main tools for obtaining lower bounds on the
number of queries in quantum algorithms. One difficulty, however, is that ap-
proximating polynomials do not directly compose: if f(x1, . . . , xn) is a Boolean
function with an approximating polynomial pf and g(y1, . . . , ym) is a Boolean
function with an approximating polynomial pg, then the polynomial on n · m
variables pf (pg, . . . , pg) that is obtained by plugging in a copy of pg for each
of the xi, is not necessarily an approximating polynomial for the composed
function f(g, . . . , g) on n · m variables. This difficulty is avoided with robust
polynomials: if pf , pg are robust for f, g respectively, then their composition is
a robust polynomial (and thus also approximating) for the composed function.
A second motivation for robust polynomials is the study of quantum decision
trees that can tolerate noise in their inputs. We show that a natural quantum
analogue of classical fault-tolerant decision trees can be defined. As a result, it
will follow that every such algorithm that uses T queries to its input bits (and
hence every classical noisy decision tree algorithm as well) implies the existence
of a robust degree-2T polynomial for the function. This relates the robust
degree to fault-tolerant quantum query algorithms in exactly the same way
that approximating polynomials are related to bounded-error quantum query
algorithms. Surprisingly, our results imply robust quantum algorithms with a
linear number of queries, as well as robust polynomials of linear degree, for any
Boolean function. This should be contrasted with the result of Feige et al. [5].
They proved that for most Boolean functions, an overhead factor of Ω(logn)
on the number of queries is needed in the noisy case compared to the non-
noisy case. In particular, consider the parity function on n variables. This
function can be decided trivially by an n-query decision tree, and hence can
be represented exactly by a real multilinear polynomial of degree n (which is
just the single monomial containing all variables in the {−1, 1} representation).
Feige et al. [5] prove that in the noisy decision tree model any algorithm for
Parity needs Θ(n logn) queries. Using standard amplification techniques, this
yields an O(n logn)-degree robust polynomial for Parity. Can one do better?
Our results imply that there is a robust polynomial for Parity of degree O(n).
However, we only have an indirect description of this polynomial by means of a
quantum algorithm, and do not know of an explicit simple construction of such
a polynomial.
2
Noisy Quantum Queries. We now discuss in more detail the model of noisy
decision trees in the quantum world. The notion of a “noisy query” in the
quantum case is not as obvious and natural as in the classical case, because one
application of a quantum query can address many different xi’s in superposition.
A first proposal would be that for each quantum query, each of the bits is flipped
independently with probability ǫ. Each such quantum query introduces a lot
of randomness and the algorithm’s state after the query is a mixed quantum
state rather than a pure state. In fact, this model is a concrete (and very
destructive) form of decoherence; the effects of various forms of decoherence on
oracle algorithms like Grover’s have been studied before, see e.g., [10, 12].
A second model, which we will adopt here, is to assume that we have n
quantum procedures, A1, . . . , An, such that Ai outputs xi with probability at
least 1 − ǫ. Such a coherent-noise model is not unreasonable. For instance, it
could be the case that the input bits are actually computed for us by subroutines.
Such algorithms can always be made coherent by pushing measurements to the
end, which means that we can apply and reverse them at will. To enable us to
apply the Ai’s in superposition, we assume we have a black box that maps
A : |i〉|0〉 7→ |i〉Ai|0〉.
One application of this will count as one query.
A third model, which we will call the multiple-noisy-copies model, was stud-
ied by Szegedy and Chen [13]. Here, instead of xi, the algorithm can only query
“perturbed” copies yi,1, . . . , yi,m of xi. The yi,j are independent Boolean ran-
dom variables with Pr[xi = yi,j ] ≥ 1− ǫ for each i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . ,m.
In contrast to the first proposal, this model leaves the queries perfectly re-
versible, since the perturbed copies are fixed at the start of the algorithm and
the same yi,j can be queried more than once. The assumption of this model
is also stronger than the second model, since we can construct a 1-query Ai
that just outputs a superposition of all yi,j . If m is sufficiently large, this Ai
will compute xi with high success probability, satisfying the assumption of the
second model (see Section 4.2 for details).
Robust Quantum Algorithms. Assuming the second model of noisy queries
and some fixed ǫ, we call a quantum algorithm robust if it computes f on n inputs
with bounded error probability when the n inputs are given by bounded-error
algorithms A1, . . . , An, respectively.
A first observation is that every T -query non-robust algorithm can be made
robust at a multiplicative cost of O(logT ). With O(log T ) queries, a majority
gate, and an uncomputation step, we can construct a unitary U˜x that approxi-
mates an exact quantum query
Ux : |i〉|b〉 7→ |i〉|b⊕ xi〉
very well in the standard operator norm: ‖Ux − U˜x‖ ≤ 1/(100T ). Since er-
rors add linearly in a quantum algorithm [3], replacing Ux by U˜x in a non-
robust algorithm gives a robust algorithm with almost the same final state. In
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some cases better constructions are possible. For instance, a recent result by
Høyer et al. [7] implies a quantum algorithm that robustly computes the n-bit
Or function with O(
√
n) queries. This is only a constant factor worse than the
noiseless case, which is Grover’s algorithm [6]. In fact, we do not know of any
function where the robust quantum query complexity is more than a constant
factor larger than the non-robust complexity.
Our main result about robust quantum algorithms (made precise in Theo-
rem 3) is the following:
There exists a quantum algorithm that outputs x1, . . . , xn, with
high probability, using O(n) invocations of the Ai algorithms (i.e.,
queries).
As already mentioned, this result implies that every n-bit function f can be
robustly quantum computed with O(n) queries. This contrasts with the classical
Ω(n logn) lower bound for Parity. It is quite interesting to note that quantum
computers, which usually are more fragile than classical computers, are actually
more robust in the case of computing Parity in this model with noisy inputs.
The result for Parity can be extended to every symmetric function: for every
such function, the optimal quantum algorithm can be made robust with only a
constant factor overhead (see Section 4.1).
Our result has a direct bearing on the direct-sum problem, which is the
question how the complexity of computing n independent instances of a function
scales with the complexity of one instance. One would expect that computing
n instances with bounded-error takes no more than n times the complexity of
one instance. However, since we want all n instances to be computed correctly
simultaneously with high probability, the only known general method in the
classical world is to compute each instance with error probability reduced to
O(1/n). This costs another factor of O(log n). In fact, it follows from the
Ω(n logn) bound for Parity that this factor of logn is optimal if we can only
run algorithms for individual instances in a black-box fashion. In contrast, our
result implies that in the quantum world, the bounded-error complexity of n
instances is at most O(n) times the bounded-error complexity of one instance.
This is a very general result. For example, it also applies to communication
complexity [9, Section 4.1.1]. If Alice and Bob have a bounded-error protocol
for a distributed function f , using c bits (or qubits) of communication, then
there is a bounded-error quantum protocol for n instances of f , using O(n(c+
logn)) qubits of communication. The additive logn is because Alice and Bob
need to communicate (possibly in superposition) the index of the instance that
they are computing. In contrast, the best known general classical solution uses
Θ(cn logn) bits of communication.
Note about Related Work. In their manuscript [8], Iwama et al. study a
similar but slightly weaker setting. There, the error probability for each input
variable is exactly ǫ. If ǫ is known, then one can use a version of exact amplitude
amplification to “rotate off” the error using O(1) queries and hence make the
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algorithm robust. If ǫ unknown, it can be estimated very well using quantum
amplitude estimation, after which amplitude amplification can be used as if ǫ
was known. Iwama et al. derive from this that any quantum algorithm can be
made robust (in their model) with only a constant factor overhead. Their model
has the disadvantage that it does not cover the subroutine-scenario, where each
input bit xi is computed for us by an algorithm or subroutine Ai whose error
we can only upper bound. Our model does not need the assumption that the
error is the same for all input bits, and hence does not have this disadvantage.
2 Robust Polynomials — Preliminaries
In this section we study robust polynomials of two different but essentially
equivalent types. The first type arises from the multiple-noisy-copies model,
the second type is what we discussed in the introduction.
2.1 Two definitions
Definition 1 Let ǫ ∈ [0, 1/2). An (ǫ,m)-perturbation of x ∈ {0, 1}n is a matrix
y of n ×m independent binary random variables yi,j such that Pr[yi,j = xi] ≥
1− ǫ for each 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
Definition 2 A type-1 (ǫ,m)-robust polynomial for the Boolean function f :
{0, 1}n → {0, 1} is a real polynomial p in nm variables yi,j (with 1 ≤ i ≤ n and
1 ≤ j ≤ m) so that for every x ∈ {0, 1}n and y an (ǫ,m)-perturbation of x, we
have
Pr[|p(y)− f(x)| > 1/3] < 1/3,
where the probability is taken over the distribution on the nm bits in y. More-
over, for every v ∈ {0, 1}nm, we require −1/3 ≤ p(v) ≤ 4/3.
Since y2i,j = yi,j for a bit yi,j , we can restrict attention tomultilinear polynomials
here.
Notice that the error parameter 1/3 in our definition of type-1 polynomial
is consistent with having expected error more than 1/2 for some x: it could be
that |p(y) − f(x)| = 1/3 with probability 2/3, and |p(y) − f(x)| = 4/3 with
probability 1/3, giving expected error 2/3. However, this is not a significant
problem, as the next lemma shows that the error parameter 1/3 can be reduced
to any small δ > 0 at only a small multiplicative cost in the degree and the
number of perturbations. It employs the following Chernoff bound from [1,
Theorem A.1.16].
Theorem 1 (Chernoff) Let Xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, be mutually independent random
variables with all E[Xi] = 0 and all |Xi| ≤ 1. Set S =
∑k
i=1Xi. Then Pr[S >
a] ≤ e−a2/2k.
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Lemma 1 Consider any δ > 0. If there is a type-1 (ǫ,m)-robust polynomial p
for f of degree d, then there exists a type-1 (ǫ,m′)-robust polynomial q for f of
degree O(d log(1/δ)) and m′ = O(m log(1/δ)), such that for x ∈ {0, 1}n and y
an (ǫ,m′)-perturbation of x, we have
Pr[|q(y)− f(x)| > δ] < δ.
Moreover, for every v ∈ {0, 1}nm′ we have q(v) ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. We first analyze the following single-variate “amplification polynomial”
of degree k:
hk(x) =
∑
i>k/2
(
k
i
)
xi(1− x)k−i.
Note that hk(x) is exactly the probability that among k coin flips with bias x
towards 1, more than half come up 1. Since it’s a probability, we have hk(x) ∈
[0, 1] for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, applying the Chernoff bound with Xi being
the outcome of the ith coin flip minus x, and a = (1/2− x)k, we have hk(x) ∈
[0, 2−Ω(k)] for all x ∈ [0, 1/3]. Similarly hk(x) ∈ [1 − 2−Ω(k), 1] for x ∈ [2/3, 1].
By “stretching” the domain a bit, we can turn this into a degree-k polynomial hk
such that hk(x) ∈ [0, 2−Ω(k)] for x ∈ [−2/5, 2/5], hk(x) ∈ [0, 1] for x ∈ [2/5, 3/5],
and hk(x) ∈ [1− 2−Ω(k), 1] for x ∈ [3/5, 7/5].
We use r independent (ǫ,m)-perturbations of x, denoted y = y1, . . . , yr, for
some number r to be determined later. For each perturbation yi it holds that
Pr[|p(yi)− f(x)| > 1/3] < 1/3. Using the amplification polynomial hk with k =
O(1) we can get the value of p closer to f : Pr[|hk(p(yi))− f(x)| > 1/20] < 1/3.
Note that the expected value of |hk(p(yi))− f(x)| is now at most (2/3)(1/20)+
(1/3)1 = 11/30. Now define an average polynomial p(y) = 1r
∑r
i=1 hk(p(yi)).
Choosing r = O(log(1/δ)), the Chernoff bound (with k = r, and Xi being the
indicator random variable for the event that |hk(p(yi)) − f(x)| > 23/60 minus
its expectation) we have
Pr[|p(y)− f(x)| > 2/5] < δ.
Finally we apply hk again, this time with degree k = O(log(1/δ)), in order to
get the value of p δ-close to the value f(x): if we define q(y) = hk(p(y)) then
Pr[|q(y)− f(x)| > δ] < δ.
The degree of q is O(d log(1/δ)), and m′ = mr = O(m log(1/δ)). The last
property of the lemma is also easily seen. 
The second kind of robust polynomial is the following:
Definition 3 For a Boolean function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, we call q a type-2
ǫ-robust polynomial for f if q is a real polynomial in n variables such that for
every x ∈ {0, 1}n and every z ∈ [0, 1]n we have |q(z)−f(x)| ≤ 1/3 if |zi−xi| ≤ ǫ
for all i ∈ [n]. If ǫ = 0, then q is called an approximating polynomial for f .
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Note that we restrict the zi’s to lie in the set [0, ǫ] ∪ [1 − ǫ, 1] rather than the
less restrictive [−ǫ, ǫ] ∪ [1 − ǫ, 1 + ǫ]. This facilitates later proofs, because it
enables us to interpret the zi’s as probabilities. However, with some extra work
we could also use the less restrictive definition here. Also note that a minimal-
degree type-2 robust polynomial for f need not be multilinear, in contrast to
the type-1 variety.
Definition 4 For f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, let rdeg1(f) denote the minimum de-
gree of any type-1 (1/3,O(logn)-robust polynomial for f , let rdeg2(f) be the
minimum degree of any type-2 1/3-robust polynomial for f , and let d˜eg(f) be
the minimum degree among all approximating polynomials for f .
Strictly speaking, we should fix an explicit constant for the O(log n) of the
type-1 polynomial, but to simplify proofs we’ll use the O(·) instead.
2.2 Relation between type-1 and type-2 robust polynomi-
als
We characterize the relation of type-1 and type-2 robust polynomials as follows:
Theorem 2 For every type-2 ǫ-robust polynomial of degree d for f there is a
type-1 (ǫ/2,O(log(n)/(1/2− ǫ)2))-robust polynomial of degree d for f .
Conversely, for every type-1 (ǫ,m)-robust polynomial of degree d for f there
is a type-2 ǫ-robust polynomial of degree O(d) for f .
Proof. Let p be a type-2 ǫ-robust polynomial of degree d for f . We choose
m = O(log(n)/(1/2− ǫ)2). If each yi,j is wrong with probability ≤ ǫ/2, then the
Chernoff bound implies that the probability that the average yi =
∑m
j=1 yi,j/m
is more than ǫ away from xi, is at most 1/(3n). Then by the union bound, with
probability at least 2/3 we have |yi−xi| ≤ ǫ for all i ∈ [n] simultaneously. Hence
the polynomial p(y1, . . . , yn) will be a type-1 (ǫ/2,O(log(n)/(1/2− ǫ)2))-robust
polynomial of degree d for f .
For the other direction, consider a type-1 (ǫ,m)-robust polynomial of degree
d for f . Using Lemma 1, we boost the approximation parameters to obtain
a type-1 (ǫ,m′)-robust polynomial p of degree O(d), with m′ = O(m), such
that for any x ∈ {0, 1}n and (ǫ,m′)-perturbation y of x, Pr[|p(y) − f(x)| >
1/9] < 1/9. For z = (z1, . . . , zn) define the formal polynomial q(z) (over the
reals) by replacing each appearance of yi,j in p(y) with zi. For z ∈ Rn with
0 ≤ zi ≤ 1 for all i, let yi,j (i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m′]) be independent 0/1 random
variables, where E[yi,j ] = zi. Then the polynomial q(z) that is defined above
can be viewed as q(z) = E[p(y)] because E[p(y)] = p(E[y]) and E[yi,j ] = zi. In
particular, if for z there exists x ∈ {0, 1}n with |zi − xi| ≤ ǫ for all i, then for
any y ∈ {0, 1}nm that is an (ǫ,m)-perturbation of x, we have q(z) = E[p(y)]
(here expectation is according to the distribution induced by y). Therefore
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V := {v ∈ {0, 1}nm : |p(v)− f(x)| < 1/9} has probability Pr[y ∈ V ] > 8/9 and
|f(x)− q(z)| ≤
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
v∈V
Pr[y = v] (f(x)− p(v))
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
v/∈V
Pr[y = v]
(
1 +
1
9
)∣∣∣∣∣ < 13 .
This means that q(z) is a type-2 ǫ-robust polynomial for f of degree O(d). 
Note, in all the above we have discussed total Boolean functions. The defini-
tions above make sense also for partial Boolean functions (or promise problems).
The theorem as well as the next corollary are true also for such cases.
Corollary 1 rdeg1(f) = Θ(rdeg2(f)) for every Boolean function f : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}.
2.3 Polynomials induced by quantum algorithms
The well known “polynomial method” [2] allows us to make a connection be-
tween “robust” quantum algorithms and robust type-1 polynomials:
Lemma 2 Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a Boolean function. Let Q be a quantum
algorithm that makes at most T queries on inputs y from {0, 1}n×m, and let Q(y)
denote the binary random variable that is its output. If for every x ∈ {0, 1}n and
y an (ǫ,m)-perturbation of x, we have that Pry[Q(y) = f(x)] ≥ 8/9 (probability
taken over the distribution on the nm bits in y as well as over the algorithm),
then there exists a degree-2T type-1 (ǫ,m)-robust polynomial for f .
Proof. By [2, Lemma 4.2], Q induces a degree-2T multilinear polynomial p
on nm variables that gives the acceptance probability of Q on fixed input y ∈
{0, 1}nm, i.e., p(y) = Pr[Q(y) = 1] (probability taken only over the algorithm).
Fix x ∈ {0, 1}n. Suppose f(x) = 0, then we want to show that Pry[p(y) >
1/3] < 1/3. Since Pry[Q(y) = f(x) = 0] ≥ 8/9, we have Ey[p(y)] = Pry[Q(y) =
1] ≤ 1/9. Hence Markov’s inequality implies Pry[p(y) > 1/3] < 1/3 and we are
done. The case f(x) = 1 is similar. 
3 Quantum Robust Input Recovery
In this section we prove our main result, that we can recover an n-bit string
x using O(n) invocations of algorithms A1, . . . , An where Ai computes xi with
bounded error. Let |x| denote the Hamming weight of a bit string x. Our main
theorem says that with high probability we can find t 1-bits in the input x (if
they are present) using O(
√
nt) noisy queries.
Theorem 3 Let ǫ ∈ [0, 1/2). Consider ǫ-error algorithms A1, . . . , An that
compute the bits x = x1, . . . , xn. For every t, 1 ≤ t ≤ n, there is a quantum
algorithm that makes O(
√
nt) queries (invocations of the Ai) and that outputs
x˜ = x˜1, . . . , x˜n such that with probability at least 2/3
8
1. for all i: x˜i = 1⇒ xi = 1
2. |x˜| ≥ min{t, |x|}.
In particular, with t = n we obtain x˜ = x using O(n) queries.
3.1 Some more preliminaries
For simplicity we assume that 0 < ǫ < 1/100 is fixed and that Ai is a unitary
transformation
Ai : |0t〉 7→ αi|0〉|ψ0i 〉+
√
1− α2i |1〉|ψ1i 〉
for some αi ≥ 0 such that |αi|2 ≤ ǫ if xi = 1 and |αi|2 ≥ 1 − ǫ if xi = 0;
|ψ0i 〉 and |ψ1i 〉 are arbitrary norm-1 quantum states. The output is the random
variable obtained from measuring the first qubit. It equals xi with probability
at least 1 − ǫ. It is standard that any quantum algorithm can be expressed in
this form by postponing measurements (i.e., unitarily write the measurement
in an auxiliary register without collapsing the state); any classical randomized
algorithm can be converted into this form by making it reversible and replacing
random bits by states (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2.
We define the following notion of closeness:
Definition 5 For ǫ ∈ [0, 1/2) and algorithms A = (A1, . . . , An), we say A is
ǫ-close to x ∈ {0, 1}n if Pr[Ai outputs xi] ≥ 1− ǫ for all i ∈ [n].
We sometimes modify our sequence of algorithms A = (A1, . . . , An) as follows.
For an n-bit string x˜, we negate the answer of Ai if x˜i = 1, and denote the
resulting sequence of n algorithms by A(x˜). Note that A(x˜) is close to 0n if and
only if x˜ = x. In other words, by finding ones in A(x˜), we find positions where x˜
differs from x. In addition, for a set S ⊆ [n] we use AS(x˜) to denote the vector
of algorithms A(x˜), except that for all i 6∈ S the ith algorithm always outputs
0 instead of running Ai. Also, for S as above and x ∈ {0, 1}n we denote by
xS ∈ {0, 1}n the string that is identical to x on indices in S and is 0 on indices
in S¯.
Our algorithm builds on a robust quantum search algorithm by Høyer,
Mosca, and de Wolf [7], which we call RobustFind. This subroutine takes a
vector A of n quantum algorithms and in the good case returns an index i
such that the “high probability” output of Ai is 1. Formally, the input/output
relation of RobustFind is stated in Theorem 4.
Theorem 4 (Høyer, Mosca, de Wolf [7]) There is a procedure RobustFind(n,
A, ǫ, β, γ, δ) where n ∈ N, A : n quantum algorithms, ǫ, β, γ, δ > 0
Output: i ∈ [n] ∪ {⊥} and with the following properties:
1. if A is ǫ-close to x ∈ {0, 1}n and x has Hamming weight |x| ≥ βn, then
i 6=⊥ with probability ≥ 1− δ
2. if A is ǫ-close to x ∈ {0, 1}n and if i 6=⊥, then xi = 1 with probability
≥ 1− γ
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Complexity: O
(
1
( 1
2
−ǫ)
2 ·
√
1
β · log 1γδ
)
invocations of the Ai
3.2 The algorithm and its intuition
Before we formally prove Theorem 3 we explain the intuition and high level of
our algorithm (as defined by the AllInputs pseudo code on page 18) and of the
proof. Clearly, for t = O(1) Theorem 3 is obvious as we can run RobustFind t
times to recover t indices i such that xi = 1 with O(
√
n) queries. Therefore all
considerations below will be for t > t0 for some t0 that is independent of n and
will be specified later.
An important feature of the robust quantum search is that it can be used to
verify a purported solution x˜ ∈ {0, 1}n by running RobustFind on A(x˜) to find
differences with the real input x.
Let x be the unique assignment such that A is ǫ-close to x. Assume first that
the Hamming weight is |x| < 3t/2. Our idea is to apply RobustFind repeatedly
for about 3t/2 times (with threshold, say, β = t/(100n)) and error probability
1/100. We expect that for at least a 98/100-fraction of the calls, RobustFind
will return an index i such that xi = 1, and expect at most a 2/100-fraction of
wrong indices. The first problem to note is that RobustFind might return the
same (correct) index over and over again. This is easily resolved as follows: We
set x˜ ∈ {0, 1}n to be x˜i = 1 for every index i that we obtained from RobustFind
and 0 everywhere else, and call RobustFind with A(x˜) rather than with A. This
means that the 1’s that are to be reported by RobustFind are in x ⊕ x˜ which
is supported on the erroneous indices of x˜, namely, on those indices that are
either 1 in x˜ but are 0 in x (false positive) and those indices that are 0 on x˜
while they are 1 on x (false negative).
Done this, we expect about 3t/200 errors of both kinds (false positive and
false negative) in the 3t/2 calls to RobustFind, which should result in x˜ being
quite close to x. We then call RobustFind 3t/4 times hoping to correct some of
the errors while not introducing too many new errors. This would be reasonable
as we call RobustFind in this second phase half the times we call it in the first
phase. Thus we expect to have half the number of new errors, while good chance
of correcting many old errors (as they are 1 in x ⊕ x˜ and hence RobustFind is
expected to report a 98/100-fraction of them). We keep doing this until the
number of expected errors is smaller than t/(log2 t). At this point we can afford
to run RobustFind for t/(log2 t) times, with error probability as low as 1/(20t).
This finds all remaining errors with high probability. Indeed this is the structure
of part 2 and part 3 of our algorithm.
However, the idea above fails to work when |x| ≫ t. To see the problem
assume that t =
√
n while |x| = n/2. Then, after the first round above, x˜ will
be supported on about
√
n indices, out of which about
√
n/100 might be false
positives. However, in every next call to RobustFind, the procedure has about
n/2−√n false negative indices to report back - those that are 1’s in x but still
0 in x˜. Thus, even if all the next O(t) calls return a correct such index, we still
might be left with the same
√
n/100 false positive errors that are introduced
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in the first round. Note that if t = n, which is the case when the algorithm
is applied to find all inputs, this last discussion is of no concern. However, for
relatively small t (which will be needed for some applications, e.g., Theorem 5)
we need to introduce a first part to the algorithm. This part is only meant to
find a subset S ⊆ [n] such that |xS | < 3t/2. Once this is done, we can use xS
instead of x in the description above, which will now work for every input.
3.3 Detailed proof
We now prove that the success probability of the algorithm is at least 2/3.
Success probability. The algorithm is composed of three parts. We first
prove that after Part 1, that is, prior to line 9, we have min(t, |x|) ≤ |xS | ≤ 3t/2
with probability 1− o(1).
Indeed, assume first that just prior to the execution of line 7 we have |S| ≥
5t/4. Then the upper bound on |xS | is trivial. For the lower bound assume
(by way of contradiction) that |xS | < t. Then we can have |S| ≥ 5t/4 only if
at least t/4 wrong indices have been reported by RobustFind. However, as we
call RobustFind with γ = 1/100 we expect at most 3t/200 errors. Thus by the
Chernoff bound we have |xS | ≥ t with probability 1− o(1).
If, on the other hand, we reach line 7 with |S| < 5t/4 then S is set to be
[n], for which the lower bound on |xS | certainly holds. For the upper bound
assume that |x| ≥ 3t/2. Then to have |S| < 5t/4 at line 7 means that at least
t/4 − t/100 errors occurred in the 3t/2 calls for RobustFind (an error here is
whenever RobustFind returns either i =⊥ or a false negative index; the t/100
term comes from the threshold β = t/(100n)). However, the error probability
in this case is at most 2/100 (as we call RobustFind with δ = γ = 1/100). Thus
we expect at most 3t/100 errors. Again by Chernoff we are done.
Accordingly, we may assume that with probability 1 − o(1), the S we have
at line 9 is such that min(t, |x|) ≤ |xS | ≤ 3t/2. In Part 2 of the algorithm
we want to find correctly most of the 1’s in xS . We maintain x˜ as our current
estimate of xS . Initially x˜ = 0n. Denote by Gk, k = 1, . . . , log((log t)
2) the event
that |x˜ ⊕ xS | < 30tk/100 at the end of the kth run of the loop in line 10; G¯k
denotes the complementary event (the negation of Gk). We prove inductively
that Pr[G¯k|Gk−1] = e−Ω(tk). This together with an assertion that Pr[G1] =
e−Ω(t) will imply that at the end of Part 2, |xS ⊕ x˜| ≤ t/ log2 t with probability
at least 9/10, assuming that t is large enough (such that e−Ω(tk) = e−Ω(t/ log
2 t) <
1/(10 log(log2 t))).
Indeed, let us examine the situation during the first round, namely for k = 1.
We call RobustFind in the first round for t1 = 3t/2 times with threshold β1n =
t/200. Thus, as long as |xS ⊕ x˜| > t/200 happens, each call to RobustFind
gives an i ∈ [n] with probability at least 99/100. Moreover, we expect at most
a 1/100 fraction of errors in the reported indices. Assume first that at the
beginning of the first round |xS ⊕ x˜| > 20t/100 and let h = |xS ⊕ x˜| − t/200.
Then after the first h calls to RobustFind we expect at least 98/100 fraction
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of correct indices. Thus with probability e−Ω(t) we will get less than 90/100
correct indices. However, if we do get at least 90100 · |xS ⊕ x˜| correct indices after
those h calls we get an x˜ for which |xS ⊕ x˜| ≤ 20100h ≤ 6t/100. Now, assuming
this happens, then G¯1 can happen at the end of the first round only if during
the rest of the 3t/2 − h ≤ 129t/100 remaining calls at least 39t/100 incorrect
indices have been made. As the probability for an incorrect index is bounded
by 1/100 we expect only at most 1.3t/100 errors. Thus, by Chernoff 39t/100
errors will occur with probability e−Ω(t). If, however, at the beginning of the
first round |xS ⊕ x˜| ≤ 20t/100 then by a similar argument G¯1 can happen at
the end of the first round only if during the 3t/2 calls to RobustFind at least
25t/100 incorrect indices have been made. Again by Chernoff this will happen
with probability e−Ω(t). This concludes the proof that Pr[G¯1] = e
−Ω(t).
We now inductively prove that Pr[G¯k|Gk−1] ≤ e−Ω(tk).
Indeed, assume that Gk−1 happens, namely that just prior to the beginning
of the kth round we have |x˜⊕xS | < 30tk−1/100 = 60tk/100. In round k we call
RobustFind with threshold βkn = tk/200; hence, as long as |x˜⊕ xS | > tk/200,
we expect RobustFind to return an index i ∈ [n] ∩ S with probability at least
99/100. Moreover, every time it returns a correct index (which occurs with
probability at least 99/100) it is a 1 in (x˜ ⊕ xS) hence reduces the weight of
symmetric difference (the total number of errors) by 1.
Suppose first that prior to round k, |x˜ ⊕ xS | < 30tk/100. Then, for G¯k
to happen at the end of round k, RobustFind would need to return at least
31tk/100 wrong indices, namely i ∈ [n] ∩ S such that x˜i = xi (returning a ⊥
here does not count as a false index). However, as the probability of a wrong
index is at most 1/100 and RobustFind is called tk times, then, by Chernoff,
the probability of G¯k is e
−Ω(tk).
Assume now that |x˜ ⊕ xS | ≥ 30tk/100 at the beginning of round k. Recall
also that by the assumption that Gk−1 occurs, we have |x˜ ⊕ xS | < 60tk/100
at the beginning of the kth round. Consider the first h = |x˜ ⊕ xS | − tk/200
calls for RobustFind. In each of those calls |x˜ ⊕ xS | > tk/200 = βkn, hence
with probability 99/100 every such call returns an index i ∈ [n] ∩ S which is
then a correct index with probability 99/100. Thus we expect that at least
98
100 · h correct indices will be returned in the first h calls. By Chernoff, the
probability that the number of correctly returned indices in those h calls is less
than 90h/100 is e−Ω(tk) (as h ≥ 15tk/100). But if the number of correctly
returned indices is at least 90h/100, then after the first h calls of RobustFind,
|x˜ ⊕ xS | < 0.2h ≤ 0.2 · 59tk/100 < 12tk/100. Thus, at this point we are still
left with 3tk/2− h calls to RobustFind which will result in G¯k only if at least
48tk/100 wrong indices will be returned. This again will happen with probability
e−Ω(tk). We conclude that in all cases Pr[G¯k|Gk−1] = e−Ω(tk).
Note that tk > t/(log
2 t). Thus if we choose t > t0 such that for every k
the probability Pr[G¯k|Gk−1] = e−Ω(tk) < 1/(10t) we get that Pr[G¯k] < 1/10 for
k = log2 t after the end of Part 2. Hence, with probability at least 0.8, we have
|x˜⊕ x| < t/(log t)2 bad indices at the end of the for loop in lines 11–17.
Finally, in Part 3 we find (with probability close to 1) all remaining wrong
indices by making the individual error probability in RobustFind so small that
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we can use the union bound: we determine each of the remaining bad indices
with error probability 1/(10t). This implies an overall success probability of at
least 0.8 · 0.9 > 2/3.
Complexity. Clearly the complexity is determined by Parts 2 and 3 of the
algorithm. We bound the number of queries to f in lines 11–17 as follows:
O

log(log2 t)∑
k=1
tk
√
1/βk

 = O

log(log2 t)∑
k=1
t
2k
√
n2k
t

 = O(√nt) (1)
The number of queries in lines 18–21 is bounded by
O

t/(log t)2∑
m=1
√
n
m
log t

 = O(√nt) .
Therefore, the total query complexity of AllInputs is O(
√
nt).
4 Making Quantum Algorithms Robust
4.1 Inputs computed by quantum algorithms
Here we state a few corollaries of Theorem 3. First, once we have recovered the
input x we can compute any function of x without further queries, hence
Corollary 2 For every f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, there is a robust quantum algo-
rithm that computes f using O(n) queries.
In particular, Parity can be robustly quantum computed with O(n) queries
while it takes Ω(n logn) queries classically [5].
Second, in the context of the direct-sum problem, the complexity of quantum
computing a vector of instances of a function scales linearly with the complexity
of one instance.
Corollary 3 (Direct Sum) If there exists a T -query bounded-error quantum
algorithm for f , then there is an O(Tn)-query bounded-error quantum algorithm
for n independent instances of f .
As mentioned, the best classical upper bound has an additional factor of logn,
and this is optimal in a classical black-box setting.
Thirdly, all symmetric functions can be computed robustly on a quantum
computer with the same asymptotic complexity as non-robustly. A function is
symmetric if its value only depends on the Hamming weight of the input. Let
Γ(f) := min{|2k − n+ 1| : f changes value if the Hamming weight of the input
changes from k to k + 1}. Beals et al. [2, Theorem 4.10] exhibited a bounded-
error quantum algorithm for f using O(
√
n(n− Γ(f) + 1)) quantum queries,
which is optimal. We show that this upper bound remains valid also for robust
algorithms.
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Theorem 5 For every symmetric function f , there is a robust quantum algo-
rithm that computes f using O(
√
n(n− Γ(f) + 1)) quantum queries.
Proof. Note that f is constant when the Hamming weight of its input lies in
the middle interval [(n − Γ(f))/2, (n + Γ(f) − 2)/2]. Using two applications
of Theorem 3 with sufficiently small error probability, we robustly search for
⌈(n − Γ(f))/2⌉ ones and n − ⌈(n + Γ(f) − 2)/2⌉ zeros in the input. If both
of these searches succeeded (i.e., found the required zeros and ones), then we
know that our input lies in the middle interval. If the search for zeros failed
(i.e., ended with fewer zeros) then we know all zeros and hence the whole input
x. Similarly, if the search for ones failed then we know x. Either way, we can
output f(x). 
4.2 Multiple noisy copies
As mentioned in the introduction, the assumption that we have a bounded-error
algorithm Ai for each of the input bits xi also covers the model of [13] where
we have a sequence yi,1, . . . , yi,m of noisy copies of xi. These we can query by
means of a mapping
|i〉|j〉|0〉 7→ |i〉|j〉|yi,j〉.
Here we spell out this connection in some more detail. First, by a Chernoff
bound, choosing m := O(log(n)/ǫ2) implies that the average yi :=
∑m
j=1 yi,j/m
is close to xi with very high probability:
Pr[|yi − xi| ≥ 2ǫ] ≤
1
100n
.
By the union bound, with probability 99/100 this closeness will hold for all
i ∈ [n] simultaneously. Assuming this is the case, we implement the following
unitary mapping using one query:
Ai : |0log(m)+1〉 7→ 1√
m
m∑
j=1
|j〉|yi,j〉.
Measuring the last qubit of the resulting state gives xi with probability at least
1 − 2ǫ. Hence, we can run our algorithm from Section 3 and recover x using
O(n) queries to the yi,j . Similarly, all consequences mentioned in Section 4.1
hold for this multiple-noisy-copies model as well.
5 Making Approximating Polynomials Robust
The next theorem follows immediately from earlier results.
Theorem 6 rdeg1,2(f) = O(n) for every f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}.
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Proof. By Corollary 2 and the discussion in Section 4.2, f has an O(n)-query
robust quantum algorithm in the multiple-noisy-copies model that operates on
O(log n) copies. By Lemma 2 this induces a type-1 robust polynomial for f of
degree O(n). And finally, by Corollary 1 there also exists a degree-O(n) type-2
robust polynomial for f . 
In particular, this shows that for functions with approximate degree Θ(n) we
can make the approximating polynomial robust at only constant factor overhead
in the degree. This case includes explicit functions like Parity and Majority,
but also random (hence almost all) functions. It is open whether approximating
polynomials can always be made robust at only a constant overhead in the
degree. The best we can do is show that a non-robust degree-d approximating
polynomial can be made robust at a cost of a factor O(log d). Our proof makes
use of the well known notion of certificate complexity.
Definition 6 An assignment C : S → {0, 1} of values to some subset S ⊆ [n]
of the n variables is consistent with x ∈ {0, 1}n if xi = C(i) for all i ∈ S.
For b ∈ {0, 1}, a b-certificate for f is an assignment C such that f(x) = b
whenever x is consistent with C. The size of C is |S|, the cardinality of S. The
certificate complexity Cx(f) of f on x is the size of a smallest f(x)-certificate
that is consistent with x. The certificate complexity of f is C(f) = maxxCx(f).
Lemma 3 Let p be an ǫ-approximating polynomial for f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, and
c = C(f) be the certificate complexity of f . If x ∈ {0, 1}n and z ∈ [0, 1]n satisfy
|xi − zi| ≤ 1/(10c) for all i ∈ [n], then |p(z)− f(x)| ≤ 6ǫ/5 + 1/10.
Proof. Consider a certificate C for x of size c. We will use xC and xC to denote
the parts of x corresponding to C and to its complement, respectively, and write
x = xCxC . If y ∈ {0, 1}n is chosen according to the z-distribution (yi = 1 with
probability zi), then
p(z) = Ey[p(y)] =
∑
yCyC
Pr[yC ] Pr[yC ]p(yCyC) =
∑
yC
Pr[yC ] · EyC [p(yCyC)].
Now consider the expectation EyC [p(y
CyC)], where yC ∈ {0, 1}n−c is fixed,
while the yC-bits are still chosen according to the z-distribution. Consider the c-
variate polynomial obtained from p by fixing the bits in yC . Since the “error” in
the zC-variables is at most 1/10c, we have Pr[yC = xC ] ≥ (1−1/(10c))c ≥ 9/10.
If yC 6= xC , then the difference between p(yCyC) and p(xCyC) is at most 1+2ǫ,
so
|EyC [p(yCyC)]− p(xCyC)| ≤ (1 + 2ǫ)/10.
But f(xCyC) = f(x), because the input xCyC is consistent with the same
certificate as x. Hence
|EyC [p(yCyC)]− f(x)| ≤ |EyC [p(yCyC)]− p(xCyC)|+ |p(xCyC)− f(x)|
≤ (1 + 2ǫ)/10 + ǫ = 1/10 + 6ǫ/5,
and also |p(z)− f(x)| ≤ 6ǫ/5 + 1/10. 
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This lemma implies that we can make a non-robust approximating polynomial
robust at the cost of a factor of O(logC(f)) in the degree: replace each vari-
able by an O(logC(f))-degree amplification polynomial as used in the proof of
Lemma 1. Since it is known that C(f) and d˜eg(f) are polynomially related
(C(f) = O(d˜eg(f)4), see [4]), we obtain:
Theorem 7 rdeg1,2(f) = O(d˜eg(f) · log d˜eg(f)).
6 Open Problems
Wemention some open problems. First, in contrast to the classical case (Parity)
we do not know of any function where making a quantum algorithm robust costs
more than a constant factor. Such a constant overhead suffices in the case of
symmetric functions and functions whose approximate degree is Ω(n). It is
conceivable that quantum algorithms (and polynomials) can always be made
robust at a constant factor overhead. Proving or disproving this would be very
interesting.
Second, we are not aware of a direct “closed form” or other natural way
to describe a robust degree-n polynomial for the parity of n bits, but can only
infer its existence from the existence of a robust quantum algorithm. Given
the simplicity of the non-robust representing polynomial for Parity, one would
hope for a simple closed form for robust polynomials for Parity as well.
Finally, we have chosen our model of a noisy query such that we can coher-
ently make a query and reverse it. It is not clear to what extent non-robust
quantum algorithms can be made resilient against decohering queries, since the
usual transformations to achieve fault-tolerant quantum computation do not
immediately apply to the query gate, which acts on a non-constant number of
quantum bits simultaneously.
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Procedure 1: AllInputs(n, t, A, ǫ)
n, t ∈ N, A : n algorithms, ǫ > 0
1: x˜← 0n
Part 1, Aim: to find a set of indices S ⊆ [n] that contains at least
min(|x|, t) and at most 3t/2 1’s of the input.
2: for 3t/2 times do
3: i← RobustFind(n,A(x˜), ǫ, t100n , 1100 , 1100 )
4: if i 6=⊥ then
5: x˜i ← 1− x˜i
6: S ← {i | x˜i = 1}
7: if |S| < 5t/4 then
8: S ← [n]
Part 2, Aim: correctly find all but t/ log2 t 1’s.
9: β ← t100n
10: x˜← 0n
11: for k ← 1 to log((log t)2) do
12: βk ← β/2k
13: tk ← 3t/2k
14: for ℓ← 1 to tk do
15: i← RobustFind(n,AS(x˜), ǫ, βkn, 1100 , 1100 )
16: if i 6=⊥ then
17: x˜i ← 1− x˜i
Part 3, Aim: correctly find all other 1’s and get rid of remaining errors.
18: for m← t/(log t)2 down to 1 do
19: i← RobustFind(n,AS(x˜), ǫ, mn , 120t , 120t )
20: if i 6=⊥ then
21: x˜i ← 1− x˜i
22: return x˜
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